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COUNTRY Korea

SUBJECT Military Supply Dumps and Routes in North Korea

DATE OF
INFO.PLACE
ACQUIREDNorth Korean Supply Dumps

1. In March 1952 some of the front line supplies for the North Korean army were stored at the following places:

SuppliesStoragesLocations

Grain

Open storage

Puroji-ri
(127-44, 38-43)
(CT-9686)

Grain and gasoline

Civilian houses and cellars

Kamjong-ni
(127-44, 38-41)
(CT-9682)

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Grain, ammunition and vehicles

Cellars

Ponghyŏn-ni
(127-42, 38-41)
(DT-8782)

Grain and ammunition

Cellars

Karhwa-ri
(127-42, 38-41)
(DT-8782)

2. These supply dumps were protected from air raids by ten anti-aircraft guns.
3. In late March 1952 North Korean army military supplies, including ammunition and food, were stored at Hanch'ŏn (128-05, 38-43) (DT-2085). Supplies, mostly food and ammunition, and personnel, destined for the eastern front, were transported by trucks as far as Hanch'ŏn. An average of 15 to 20 trucks reached this supply point each day. From Hanch'ŏn the supplies were carried by civilians and North Korean soldiers over Onjŏng-nyŏng (128-06, 38-43) (DT-2285), which is too steep for vehicles. Approximately 500 soldiers and 150 civilians were employed in this operation daily. The disproportion between the amount of supplies transported by the trucks and that which could be relayed by the civilian-soldier teams caused the supply dumps at Hanch'ŏn to grow larger each day.
4. The trucks were usually operated at night. In the event of air strikes during daylight hours, the trucks were hidden in shelters constructed in the forests along the roads. Types of trucks used included new Soviet Zis and GAZ trucks, Japanese Nissan trucks, and some American GMC trucks.
5. In mid-April arms and ammunition for the North Korean 23 Brigade, IV Corps, were stored in shelters at the foot of a hill at Yonggong-ni (126-03, 38-47) (DT-4496), 20 kilometers northeast of the Hwangju railroad station. Food, clothing, and medical supplies for the North Korean 23 Brigade were stored in 20 houses at Sangsam-ni (125-40, 38-52) (YD-3105).
6. In early April the supply dumps of the North Korean 2 Regiment, 47 Division, I Corps, were at Kyewŏl-li (128-17, 38-41) (DT-3681). The supplies were stored in seven dugouts at the base of a hill, and the area was camouflaged with pine trees. The entrances to the dugouts are 1.2 meters high and 0.8 meters wide, and the roofs are covered with soil 2 meters thick. Pine trees growing thickly in the area blend with the other camouflage.
7. All supplies for the 2 Regiment were stored at the Kyewŏl-li dump before being forwarded to each battalion. Two squads, about 20 men, were assigned to guard the dumps.

Chinese Communist Supply Dumps

8. In early April 1952 a supply dump of the Chinese Communist 4 Field Army was in more than 20 village houses at Sanum-ni (125-42, 39-16) (YD-3349).
9. In mid-April a supply dump containing arms and ammunition for the Chinese Communist 40 Army was in an underground shelter 200 meters long and 30 meters wide on a hill at Taesin-ni, 4 kilometers northeast of Chungkwa station (125-47, 38-51) (YD-4203). Food, clothing, and some ammunition for the Chinese Communist 40 Army were stored in about 15 village houses at Tajong-ni (125-25, 39-01) (YD-0921).

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Military Supply Routes

10. In February 1952 all foreign aid to North Korea was being transported into North Korea from a supply dump at Chian, Manchuria. At night the supplies were transported across the Yalu River on a wooden bridge between Chian and Manp'ojin.² The average traffic across the bridge was 20 to 30 vehicles per night.
11. Kowon (127-15, 39-26) (CU-4966) is one of the most important points on the railroad supply line to the eastern front. Approximately 1,000 Chinese Communist and North Korean troops work in the Kowon Branch Bureau of the North Korean Ministry of Transportation.

Maintenance of Supply Routes

12. The North Korean army has established compulsory labor crews, each assigned to a certain area, to repair the railroads when they are damaged.³ The labor crews are experienced and can repair a 30 meter length of bombed-out track in 2 hours.⁴
13. In a tunnel between Kowon and Kwang'yong-ni (127-15, 39-39) (CU-5090) there are many North Korean and Chinese Communist army personnel manufacturing and repairing railroad equipment with the use of lathes. The chief deficiency is the lack of boilers and bearings.

Communist Truck Shelters on East Coast

14. Chinese Communist and North Korean supply trucks usually operate at night. Air raid shelters are constructed along the roads for the protection of the supply vehicles during daylight hours. These shelters are camouflaged with pine trees. The following coordinates designate the principal shelters along the east coast supply route:

a. Shelter for North Korean vehicles:

(127-54, 38-38) (DE-053767)
 (127-47, 38-43) (DE-947866)
 (127-50, 38-43) (DE-984856)
 (127-50, 38-42) (DE-985852)
 (127-50, 38-42) (DE-985844)
 (128-04, 38-36) (DE-189733)
 (128-04, 38-36) (DE-191732)

b. Shelter for Chinese Communist vehicles:

(127-58, 38-33) (DE-113684)

c. Shelters for both Chinese Communist and North Korean vehicles:

(127-53, 38-45) (DE-022893)
 (127-53, 38-39) (DE-034794)

15. There is an underground vehicle repair service station at approximately (127-58, 38-37) (DE-111754).

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- 25X1A 1. Comment. Probably Toksan-ni (125-49, 38-52) (YD-4405) is meant instead of Taesin-ni.
- 25X1A 2.
- 25X1A 3.
- 25X1A 4. Comment. To deactivate a supply line for an effective length of time, the railroad track should be destroyed by bombing within a distance of 30 kilometers in at least six or seven places.

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